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Is all morality subjective?
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Is All Morality Subjective?
If you were asked whether it is wrong to torture an innocent child, your immediate reaction would likely be one of absolute, non-negotiable horror. Yet, if morality is merely a byproduct of human evolution or cultural conditioning, that horror is no more objective than a dislike of broccoli. This is the central tension of moral philosophy: we live our lives as if moral facts are as real as gravity, yet we struggle to find them in the physical world.
To answer whether all morality is subjective, we must distinguish between *where our moral beliefs come from* and *whether those beliefs refer to objective truths*.
## The Case for Moral Realism
Many philosophers argue that morality is objective, a view known as [Moral Realism](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/). Realists argue that certain moral claims are true regardless of what any individual or culture believes. Just as the earth was round before humans discovered it, certain actions are wrong regardless of our opinions.
The prominent philosopher G.E. Moore argued in his landmark work, *Principia Ethica*, that "good" is a simple, indefinable property that we perceive through moral intuition. Realists point out that when we debate moral issues, such as human rights or justice, we are not merely expressing personal tastes. We are behaving as if there is a correct answer to be found. If morality were entirely subjective, a statement like "slavery is wrong" would merely mean "I dislike slavery," making genuine moral disagreement impossible.
## The Case for Moral Anti-Realism
Conversely, defenders of [Moral Anti-Realism](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/) argue that morality is fundamentally subjective. A major proponent of this view was the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume, who famously argued in *A Treatise of Human Nature* that we cannot derive an "ought" from an "is."
> "Take any action allowed to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice... The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action."
In the twentieth century, J.L. Mackie championed "Error Theory" in his book *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. Mackie argued that while our moral language *claims* to be objective, all such claims are actually false because objective moral values simply do not exist in the universe.
Ultimately, while our *perceptions* of morality are undoubtedly shaped by subjective factors like culture and biology, the question of whether a fundamental moral reality exists remains one of the most vital debates in philosophy.
## Follow-up questions
1. If evolutionary biology can fully explain why we feel certain actions are wrong, does that completely undermine the argument for objective moral truths?
2. How can moral realists explain the vast and persistent disagreement about moral issues across different cultures and historical eras?
3. If we accept that morality is entirely subjective, on what grounds can we legitimately judge or interfere with the practices of other cultures?
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Question
How does this link to Mackie's idea of queerness?
Regarding: "To answer whether all morality is subjective, we must distinguish between where our moral beliefs come from and whether those beliefs refer to objective truths."
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Answer
The Queerness of Objective Values: Mackie's Radical Skepticism
Could the universe itself contain a property that, upon being perceived, instantly compels you to act in a certain way? This is the startling implication of believing in objective moral truths—and it is precisely what the Australian philosopher J.L. Mackie argued is too bizarre to be real.
To understand why the distinction between the *origins* of our moral beliefs and their *objective reality* is so critical, we must examine Mackie's famous [Argument from Queerness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_queerness), presented in his seminal work, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (1977).
## The Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzle
Mackie's argument is a cornerstone of [moral skepticism](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/), specifically his "error theory." He argues that while our moral language *claims* to refer to objective truths, all such claims are systematically false. Mackie splits his argument into two dimensions of "queerness":
1. **Metaphysical Queerness:** If objective values existed, they would be entities, qualities, or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.
2. **Epistemological Queerness:** If we were aware of such values, it would have to be through some strange faculty of moral intuition, entirely different from our ordinary ways of knowing about the world (like sensory perception or scientific inquiry).
To illustrate metaphysical queerness, Mackie highlights the bizarre motivational power that objective values would need to possess.
> "An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it."
> — J.L. Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (1977)
If "do not steal" were an objective cosmic truth, the property of "wrongness" would have to actively broadcast a magnetic, motivational force. This is why Mackie argues that our moral beliefs do not refer to objective facts; rather, they are subjective projections.
## Origins vs. Reference: Why the Distinction Matters
This directly connects to the distinction between where our moral beliefs *come from* (their evolutionary or cultural origins) and what they *refer to* (objective truths).
If we look at the origins of morality, we find plausible, naturalistic explanations. Humans evolved as social animals; empathy, cooperation, and altruism helped our ancestors survive. We can fully explain *why* we believe murder is wrong through biology and sociology without ever appealing to "objective moral facts" written into the fabric of the universe.
Mackie uses this genetic explanation to undermine the claim that our beliefs refer to objective realities. If our moral beliefs are completely explained by our evolutionary conditioning and cultural upbringing, we have no reason to postualte the existence of "queer" objective properties to explain them.
## The Contemporary Debate: Partners in Guilt?
Realist philosophers have fought back against Mackie's skepticism. One prominent counterargument, championed by thinkers like Terence Cuneo in his book *The Normative Web* (2007), is the "partners in guilt" response.
These philosophers argue that if we reject moral properties because they are "queer," we must also reject other normative concepts, such as epistemic reasons (the rules of logic and rationality). If there are objective reasons to believe a claim based on evidence, then "epistemic normativity" exists. If epistemic reasons are acceptable, why not moral reasons? Mackie's critics suggest that his criteria for what is "too queer" to exist might dismantle rational thought itself.
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Steel Man
The Steel Man of Metaphysical Queerness
How can a silent, material universe contain properties that command us to act? To dismiss J.L. Mackie’s claim of "queerness" as mere incredulity misses the profound challenge he poses. When properly reconstructed, the argument from metaphysical queerness is not a superficial complaint about weirdness; it is a sophisticated demand for ontological parsimony and explanatory coherence. It asks how objective, prescriptive properties can possibly integrate with our modern, scientific understanding of the natural world.
## The Core of the Steel Man: Intrinsic Motivating Power
To steel-man the metaphysical branch of the [Argument from Queerness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_queerness), we must articulate the precise nature of the "strangeness" Mackie identifies in *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (1977). The strength of the argument lies in the unique dual-nature of objective moral values: they must be simultaneously *objective* (part of the fabric of the world, independent of us) and *prescriptive* (intrinsically action-guiding).
In modern analytic philosophy, this is formulated as a clash between realism and the Humean theory of motivation. As the eminent moral philosopher Richard Joyce notes in [*The Myth of Morality*](https://cambridge.org/core/books/myth-of-morality/7E2404A81E99596B8B4E639A68367F68), normal external facts are descriptive; they require an internal desire (a "conative state") to move us to action. For example, the fact "it is raining" only moves me to grab an umbrella if I *desire* to stay dry.
However, objective moral properties must possess what Mackie called "to-be-pursuedness" built directly into them.
> "An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it."
> — J.L. Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*
To-be-pursuedness requires a magnetic, motivational force that exists independently of human desires, yet acts directly upon human agency. This violates our best metaphysical theories of how the physical world interacts with mind and agency.
## Supporting Foundations: The Supervenience Problem
The strongest support for metaphysical queerness comes from the problem of **supervenience**—how moral properties relate to natural properties. If an act of cruelty is objectively wrong, the "wrongness" is not a physical property like mass or velocity. Instead, it must "supervene" or hang upon the natural facts (the infliction of pain).
A sophisticated defender of Mackie, such as philosopher [Stephen Yablo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Yablo), would argue that this supervenience relation itself is metaphysically baffling. Why should a entirely different, non-natural property of "wrongness" inevitably and necessarily emerge from a specific configuration of physical matter? In any other domain of science, relations between different levels of reality (like chemistry emerging from physics) are causally and logically explicable. Moral supervenience, by contrast, requires a unique, brute, and unexplainable metaphysical glue.
## Defending Against the Realist Rebuttal
The most formidable objection to Mackie comes from "Cornell Realists" like Nicholas Sturgeon, who argue that moral properties are simply complex natural properties, no stranger than biological or psychological states.
A sophisticated defender of queerness responds by pointing out that biological states do not carry intrinsic, categorical imperatives. A biological state can tell us what *is* happening, but it cannot contain an inescapable, authoritative *ought* that binds an agent regardless of their goals. By stripping moral properties of their categorical authority to make them fit into the natural world, the realist ceases to talk about *objective values* at all, effectively conceding Mackie's point.
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