## Challenging the Mind-First View
While John Searle’s philosophy insists that institutional facts require conscious human minds to assign functions via collective agreement, a prominent counter-perspective in sociology and science studies challenges this rigid separation. Developed by scholars like French philosopher Bruno Latour, **Actor-Network Theory (ANT)**—a framework that treats both human and non-human entities as active participants in shaping social life—argues that physical objects can possess an intrinsic capacity to organize human behavior without waiting for a human mental decree.
Rather than viewing the material world as passive matter waiting for humans to breathe social meaning into it, ANT suggests that physical objects actively participate in creating and maintaining institutional order. This capability is known as **material agency**, which refers to the capacity of physical objects to act, constrain, or transform human relationships and social structures directly.
## The Resistance of Things
To see how an object might possess an institutional or organizational function without pure human invention, consider how physical architecture shapes human power. A heavy steel security door or an automated passport gate does not merely reflect a human rule about borders; its physical weight, geometry, and engineering actively enforce the border. If the power mechanism fails, the institutional fact of restricted access temporarily collapses, demonstrating that the object is an active partner in upholding the rule.
Latour famously emphasized that society is not composed solely of humans interacting in a vacuum, but is built through mixed networks of humans and "non-human actants". In *Reassembling the Social*, Latour argues that if an object alters the course of action of a human group, it must be recognized as an active participant:
> If an action is tried, any thing that modifies a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor.
> — Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social
From this vantage point, a physical object does not just passively "count as" something else because we think it does; rather, its physical constraints, affordances, and stubborn material properties push back against human intentions, actively generating social order on their own terms.
## Comparing Theoretical Frameworks
The contrast between a purely mentalist approach to institutions and a material-network approach highlights a deep division in how social reality is understood.
| Attribute | Searle’s Institutionalism | Actor-Network Theory (Latour) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **Primary Driver** | Human minds and collective intentionality | Networks of mixed human and non-human actors |
| **Status of Objects** | Passive; they only have function because humans assign it | Active; objects possess material agency and alter social outcomes |
| **Origin of Social Order** | Imposed from the top down via rules ("X counts as Y") | Emergent from the bottom up through physical and conceptual connections |
Ultimately, whether physical objects can possess an institutional function without human intervention depends on whether we view society as a product exclusively of human thought or as a sprawling, hybrid network where things and people constantly shape one another.