What is Methodism?

Can we truly define a reliable method for acquiring knowledge before we know what actual instances of knowledge look like? To assume we can is the central hubris of **Methodism**—the epistemological stance that prioritizes the establishment of a criterion of knowledge over the recognition of particular, undeniable truths. By demanding a validated procedure before accepting any fact, Methodism traps itself in an infinite regress or a sterile skepticism. It falls victim to what the ancient skeptic Sextus Empiricus identified as the *Problem of the Criterion*, a challenge famously revived in modern philosophy by Roderick Chisholm in his landmark work, [*The Problem of the Criterion*](https://www.marquette.edu/mupress/Chisholm.shtml). ## The Cart Before the Horse: Why Methodism Fails Methodism insists we must first answer the question *How are we to decide whether we know?* before we can answer *What do we know?* This approach suffers from three fatal flaws: 1. **The Regress of Justification**: If we must have a method to identify truth, we must also have a meta-method to verify that our chosen method is reliable. This second-order method requires a third-order method, leading to an infinite regress. 2. **Epistemic Paralysis**: In practice, humanity has never advanced by waiting for a flawless methodology. Science did not begin with a fully formed scientific method; rather, successful discoveries (particulars) were made first, and the "method" was abstracted afterward. 3. **The Denial of Intuitive Certainty**: Methodism forces us to doubt obvious, immediate experiences—such as the sensation of pain or the existence of the external world—simply because we cannot yet provide a systematic, methodological defense of them. ## The Particularist Alternative: Starting with What We Know In contrast to Methodism, **Particularism** argues that we must start with our clear, pre-theoretical intuitions of knowledge. We know, for instance, that we have hands, and that the sun is warm. We use these robust, particular instances of knowledge to test and refine our methods, not the other way around. As Roderick Chisholm argues in his paper, [*All These Questions About Knowledge*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107122), the Methodist's demand is fundamentally misguided: > "To find out whether you know, you must have a procedure, or a criterion... But how do you know that your procedure is a good one? ... You must already know some things, if you are to be able to decide whether your procedure is a good one." This sentiment is echoed by G.E. Moore in his famous defense of common sense, [*Proof of an External World*](https://archive.org/details/proofofexternalw00moor). Moore bypassed methodological skepticism by simply holding up his hands, declaring that the immediate certainty of his physical existence far outweighed any abstract, skeptical methodology designed to doubt it. ## The Failure of Rigid Methodologies in Practice We see the real-world failure of Methodism in the rigid, algorithmic approaches to science and social policy. - In the philosophy of science, Paul Feyerabend, in his radical critique [*Against Method*](https://www.versobooks.com/products/2094-against-method), demonstrated that the greatest scientific breakthroughs—such as Galileo's defense of Copernicanism—violated every established methodological rule of their time. - In economics and artificial intelligence, relying strictly on pre-defined, algorithmic "methods" to predict human behavior consistently fails because it cannot account for novel, particular anomalies that defy existing paradigms. By prioritizing the *recipe* over the *food*, Methodism leaves us starving for actual truth. True inquiry must begin with the world as we find it, not with a dogmatic rulebook that prevents us from seeing what is right in front of our eyes.