The claim that language is inherently social and requires public criteria—a cornerstone of Wittgenstein’s later thought—faces significant opposition from traditions that prioritize the individual mind as the primary locus of meaning. These critiques suggest that meaning is not fundamentally a "game" played between actors, but a structural or biological property of the individual subject.
## Methodological Solipsism and the Cartesian Tradition
Critiques rooted in the Cartesian tradition argue for **first-person authority**, the idea that an individual has privileged, non-inferential access to their own mental states. If a subject experiences a unique sensation, they can assign a mental token to represent it.
The argument against public criteria suggests:
- **Foundationalism:** Meaning begins with the self-evident nature of one’s own consciousness.
- **Internal Reference:** If a subject identifies a recurring internal state (e.g., a specific "raw feel" or *quale*), they can establish a rule for its identification that remains valid for them, even if it cannot be verified by an external observer.
## The Language of Thought Hypothesis
Jerry Fodor’s **Language of Thought (LOT)** or "Mentalese" provides a robust alternative framework. LOT posits that thinking occurs in a mental language that is prior to and independent of any public, spoken language.
Key challenges from this perspective include:
- **Symbolic Computation:** Mental representations acquire meaning through their causal roles within the brain's architecture, not through social convention.
- **Pre-social Meaning:** If animals or pre-verbal infants possess complex thoughts, meaning must exist before the acquisition of social language. This implies that the "rules" of thought are biological or computational rather than cultural.
## Innateness and Generative Grammar
Noam Chomsky’s theory of **Universal Grammar** suggests that the capacity for language is a hard-wired biological endowment. This challenges the social-dependency model by shifting the focus from social interaction to internal cognitive structures.
From this viewpoint:
- **Biological Determinism:** The "correct application" of linguistic rules is governed by the brain’s neuro-biological constraints, not by public consensus.
- **The Poverty of the Stimulus:** Since children acquire complex linguistic structures that exceed the social input they receive, the core of language must be an internal, private template rather than a socially negotiated behavior.
## The Inverted Spectrum and Qualia
The **Inverted Spectrum** thought experiment serves as a counter-example to public criteria. If two individuals use the word "red" to describe the same public objects but have different internal experiences (e.g., one sees what the other would call "green"), their public behavior is identical.
This suggests:
- **Meaning Gap:** Public criteria can ensure functional communication while failing to capture the actual content of the linguistic term (the internal sensation).
- **Subjective Essence:** If the essence of a word like "red" lies in the subjective experience, then the social rule is merely a superficial layer that does not touch the core of semantic meaning.